派生自 IRIS 实例的 feature/ai-audit-update @ 192c8ee,在同一台机器上独立运行。 隔离机制(开关集中在 app/core/config.py 的 ORG_DEPARTMENT / MATERIAL_CATEGORY_PREFIX): - 登录:sys_user 查询增加 department 条件,非本部门账号一律 401 - 人员列表:服务端钉死部门、忽略客户端传参;删除「异常退回全表」的降级分支 - 物料:groups 与 items 都增加 category LIKE 'LICA/%' 前缀过滤 - 人员操作统计:把硬编码的 department='IRIS' 改为配置项 物料为什么用前缀而不是 LIKE '%LICA%': MOM 里存在 171 条 IRIS/成品/LICA/...(无人机/野外便携/高塔监测等), 模糊匹配会把这些 IRIS 物料漏给 LICA。实测前缀匹配命中 795 条 / 5 个分组。 部署隔离: - 端口 8030/8031/8032,容器名 lica_*,卷 lica_pgdata(与 IRIS 完全独立) - 服务名改为 lica_backend,避免在 projects_default 网络上与 IRIS 的 backend 重名 —— 否则将来任何一方写 http://backend:8000 会随机打到另一个部门 - SECRET_KEY 重新生成:实测两边 token 互不通用(双向 401) 客户端标识(不改会导致两个部门的客户端互相覆盖): - Tauri identifier 改 com.lica.production(否则桌面端互相覆盖安装,且共用 WebView 数据目录会让 track_admin_token 串号) - uni-app appid 改 __UNI__D2F4A19(否则同机 APK 互相覆盖、wgt 热更新串号) - uni-app 地址端口 8011 → 8031(收敛在 utils/config.js 单一来源) - sync-watch.sh 的 DST 指向 LICA 专属 HBuilderX 目录(否则会把源码灌进 IRIS 工程) 排除项:未复制 deploy.sh / deploy_full.sh / docker-compose.prod.yml —— 它们写死了 IRIS 的生产服务器,误跑会覆盖线上系统。
155 lines
5.6 KiB
Python
155 lines
5.6 KiB
Python
"""认证服务 — 对接 MOM 系统 sys_user 表 + Track 自有 JWT(双 Token 架构)"""
|
||
from fastapi import HTTPException, status, Depends, Request
|
||
from fastapi.security import HTTPBearer, HTTPAuthorizationCredentials
|
||
from jose import JWTError, jwt
|
||
from werkzeug.security import check_password_hash
|
||
|
||
from app.core.config import settings
|
||
from app.core.security import (
|
||
create_access_token,
|
||
create_refresh_token,
|
||
decode_token,
|
||
ALGORITHM,
|
||
TOKEN_TYPE_ACCESS,
|
||
TOKEN_TYPE_REFRESH,
|
||
)
|
||
from app.core.mom_database import MomSessionLocal
|
||
from app.core.logging import user_var
|
||
from app.schemas.user import LoginResponse, UserResponse
|
||
|
||
security = HTTPBearer()
|
||
|
||
|
||
def login(username: str, password: str) -> LoginResponse:
|
||
"""登录 — 签发双 Token(Access + Refresh)"""
|
||
db = MomSessionLocal()
|
||
try:
|
||
# 1. 普通用户:LIKE '%/username' 模糊匹配 MOM sys_user 表
|
||
# 并且只允许本部门(settings.ORG_DEPARTMENT)的人登录 —— IRIS 与 LICA
|
||
# 共用同一个 MOM 库,这里不加部门条件的话,另一个部门的人也能登进来。
|
||
# 不匹配时统一报「用户名或密码错误」,不区分「账号不存在」与「存在但
|
||
# 不属于本部门」,避免给账号探测者提供线索。
|
||
from sqlalchemy import text
|
||
result = db.execute(
|
||
text(
|
||
"SELECT id, username, department, role, password_hash "
|
||
"FROM sys_user "
|
||
"WHERE username LIKE :pattern "
|
||
" AND department = :dept"
|
||
),
|
||
{"pattern": f"%/{username}", "dept": settings.ORG_DEPARTMENT},
|
||
)
|
||
row = result.fetchone()
|
||
|
||
if not row:
|
||
raise HTTPException(
|
||
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
|
||
detail="用户名或密码错误",
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
user_id, full_username, department, role, password_hash = row
|
||
|
||
# 2. Werkzeug scrypt 密码验证
|
||
if not check_password_hash(password_hash, password):
|
||
raise HTTPException(
|
||
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
|
||
detail="用户名或密码错误",
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
# 3. 解析 display_name("张三/zhangsan01" → "张三")
|
||
display_name = full_username.split("/")[0] if "/" in full_username else full_username
|
||
|
||
token_data = {
|
||
"sub": str(user_id),
|
||
"role": role or "operator",
|
||
"username": username,
|
||
"display_name": display_name,
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return LoginResponse(
|
||
access_token=create_access_token(data=token_data),
|
||
refresh_token=create_refresh_token(data=token_data),
|
||
user=UserResponse(
|
||
id=str(user_id),
|
||
username=username,
|
||
display_name=display_name,
|
||
role=role or "operator",
|
||
),
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
finally:
|
||
db.close()
|
||
|
||
|
||
def refresh_access_token(refresh_token: str) -> dict:
|
||
"""
|
||
使用 Refresh Token 换取新的 Access Token。
|
||
校验:
|
||
1. Token 签名是否有效
|
||
2. Token type 是否为 "refresh"
|
||
3. Token 是否未过期
|
||
"""
|
||
try:
|
||
payload = decode_token(refresh_token)
|
||
except JWTError:
|
||
raise HTTPException(
|
||
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
|
||
detail="Refresh Token 无效或已过期,请重新登录",
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
# 校验 token 类型
|
||
if payload.get("type") != TOKEN_TYPE_REFRESH:
|
||
raise HTTPException(
|
||
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
|
||
detail="无效的 Token 类型,仅接受 Refresh Token",
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
# 提取用户信息,签发新的 Access Token
|
||
access_token = create_access_token(
|
||
data={
|
||
"sub": payload.get("sub"),
|
||
"role": payload.get("role", "operator"),
|
||
"username": payload.get("username", ""),
|
||
"display_name": payload.get("display_name", ""),
|
||
}
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
return {"access_token": access_token, "token_type": "bearer"}
|
||
|
||
|
||
async def get_current_user(
|
||
request: Request,
|
||
credentials: HTTPAuthorizationCredentials = Depends(security),
|
||
) -> dict:
|
||
"""从 Bearer Token 解析当前用户(仅接受 Access Token)"""
|
||
token = credentials.credentials
|
||
try:
|
||
payload = decode_token(token)
|
||
user_id = payload.get("sub")
|
||
if not user_id:
|
||
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="无效的 Token")
|
||
|
||
# 校验:仅接受 access token
|
||
if payload.get("type") == TOKEN_TYPE_REFRESH:
|
||
raise HTTPException(
|
||
status_code=401,
|
||
detail="请使用 Access Token 访问 API,Refresh Token 仅用于刷新",
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
# 操作人身份要写两处,用途不同,缺一不可:
|
||
# 1) contextvar —— 供本请求任务内的业务/service 日志使用;
|
||
# 2) request.state —— 中间件在独立 task 中执行(Starlette 的
|
||
# BaseHTTPMiddleware 用 anyio start_soon 起新 task,而 asyncio
|
||
# 每个 Task 会复制 context),因此中间件读不到路由内改的
|
||
# contextvar,只能通过 ASGI scope 承载的 state 拿到。
|
||
# username 即 assignee_id 口径,比数字 id 直观得多。
|
||
user_label = payload.get("username") or user_id
|
||
user_var.set(user_label)
|
||
request.state.audit_user = user_label
|
||
request.state.audit_display_name = payload.get("display_name") or ""
|
||
request.state.audit_role = payload.get("role") or ""
|
||
|
||
return payload
|
||
except JWTError:
|
||
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="无效的 Token")
|