feat(audit): 新增操作审计日志(表/中间件/查询接口)+ 角色常量收敛
背景:系统此前没有操作审计。task_logs 的 task_id 是 NOT NULL 外键,只能挂在 任务上,且全项目仅 4 处写入点 —— 登录、导出、产品增删改、收编完全不留痕。 需求方整理的问题清单里「无审计日志查看页」正源于此:不是没有页面,是没数据。 设计参考 MOM(KCGL) 的 audit_logs / audit_listener,但按 Track 栈做了取舍: 1) 写入时机:MOM 用 SQLAlchemy event listener + 同事务写入,优点是零侵入, 缺点是**业务回滚时审计一起消失**,而失败/被拒的操作(越权尝试、参数错误) 恰恰最需要留痕。Track 改为响应生成后用**独立 session** 写入: - 业务回滚不影响审计(已验证 422/401 失败操作同样落库) - 审计写入失败也不影响业务(全包裹 try/except) - 代价:非原子提交,响应后进程立即被 kill 可能丢一条(已注释说明取舍) 2) 采集方式:中间件自动采集写操作 + 导出/下载/打印这类「读但敏感」的 GET。 路径段推导 module/action/target_id。不做手写埋点,因为手写必然漏 —— task_logs 只有 4 处写入点就是前车之鉴。 3) 增量价值:新增 request_id 字段,与 core/logging.py 的结构化日志打通, 凭一个 ID 就能从审计记录直接跳到那一次接口日志。MOM 无此字段。 4) 敏感信息:details 经 sanitize_details 递归剔除 password/token/secret 等键; 中间件不读请求体,登录明文密码不会落库(已断言表内无密码痕迹)。 配套改动: - core/roles.py:角色常量与 is_admin 收敛为单一事实来源。此前同一份 「管理员角色」规则散在 task_service、products.py 内联判断和前端 constants/task.ts 三处,已因此发生过「移动端漏判 SUPERVISOR 误挡主管」。 task_service 改为从 core.roles 导入同名常量,保持既有引用可用。 - core/deps.py:抽出 require_roles/require_admin 可复用依赖,替代内联判断。 - main.py:500 响应显式补 X-Request-ID 头 —— 该响应由 ServerErrorMiddleware 生成,位于 RequestContextMiddleware 外层,中间件没机会写头。 - auth.py:登录校验前把「尝试的账号」写入 request.state,使登录事件 (含失败登录)可归属到人,可用于追踪暴力破解。 验证:本地起 PostgreSQL 17 + 迁移后跑端到端测试,32/32 通过 (TestClient 每个请求新建事件循环,与模块级 asyncpg 连接池冲突会报 "got Future attached to a different loop",故改用 httpx.AsyncClient + ASGITransport 单循环;生产 uvicorn 单循环无此问题)。
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backend/app/core/audit_middleware.py
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backend/app/core/audit_middleware.py
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"""审计采集中间件
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在响应生成后,把「谁 / 何时 / 从哪来 / 调了哪个接口 / 做了什么 / 结果如何」
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落进 audit_logs。
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为什么用中间件自动采集,而不是在每个业务函数里手写 record_audit
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------------------------------------------------------------------
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1. 手写必然漏。新加的端点很容易忘记补审计,而审计的价值恰恰建立在「完整」上。
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现状可佐证:task_logs 全项目只有 4 处写入点,凡是不挂在任务上的动作
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(登录、导出、改产品)全都没有留痕。
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2. 中间件能拿到业务函数拿不到的事实:真实来源 IP、UA、最终状态码、
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以及与结构化日志对齐的 request_id。
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3. 业务语义(module / target)由路径推导,不如手写精确,但对「谁动了什么」
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的追责场景已经够用;关键动作后续可再调 record_audit 补 details 做增强。
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采集范围
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--------
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- 所有写操作(POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE)
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- 少数**读但敏感**的操作:导出、下载、打印(本项目 GET /people-history/export
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就是导出,只按方法过滤会漏掉)
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明确不采集:GET /health*、/docs、/openapi.json —— 探针与文档的噪声没有审计价值。
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import logging
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from fastapi import Request
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from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware, RequestResponseEndpoint
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from starlette.responses import Response
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from app.services.audit_service import record_audit
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logger = logging.getLogger("track.audit")
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# 写操作一律采集
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_MUTATING_METHODS = frozenset({"POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE"})
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# 读操作里需要留痕的(导出/下载/打印属于「读」,但把数据带出了系统)
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_SENSITIVE_READ_KEYWORDS = frozenset({"export", "download", "print"})
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# 永久忽略的路径前缀
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_IGNORED_PREFIXES = ("/health", "/docs", "/redoc", "/openapi.json")
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# 路径段 → 审计模块
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_PATH_MODULE: dict[str, str] = {
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"products": "product",
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"tasks": "task",
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"orders": "order",
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"records": "record",
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"print": "print",
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"materials": "material",
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"users": "user",
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"upload": "upload",
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"notifications": "notification",
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"app-version": "app",
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"analytics": "analytics",
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"dashboard": "dashboard",
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"holidays": "holiday",
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"screen": "screen",
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"webhooks": "external",
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"external": "external",
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"audit": "audit",
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"auth": "auth",
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}
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# 路径段 → 动作(优先于按 HTTP 方法推断)
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_SEGMENT_ACTION: dict[str, str] = {
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"login": "login",
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"logout": "logout",
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"refresh": "refresh",
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"export": "export",
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"download": "export",
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"print": "print",
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"upload": "upload",
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"finalize": "finalize",
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"receive": "receive",
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"transfer": "transfer",
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"reject": "reject",
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"recall": "recall",
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"spawn": "spawn",
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"complete": "complete",
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"end": "end",
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}
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_METHOD_ACTION: dict[str, str] = {
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"POST": "create",
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"PUT": "update",
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"PATCH": "update",
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"DELETE": "delete",
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"GET": "read",
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}
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# 不可能是业务 ID 的路径段,避免把动作词误当成 target_id
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_NON_ID_SEGMENTS = frozenset(
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set(_SEGMENT_ACTION) | {"api", "v1", "me", "options", "export", "lookup", "batch"}
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)
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def _derive_module_and_action(path: str, method: str) -> tuple[str, str, str | None]:
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"""由请求路径与 HTTP 方法推导 (module, action, target_id)"""
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parts = [p for p in path.split("/") if p]
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module = "other"
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module_idx = -1
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for i, seg in enumerate(parts):
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if seg in _PATH_MODULE:
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module = _PATH_MODULE[seg]
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module_idx = i
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break
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action = None
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for seg in reversed(parts):
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if seg in _SEGMENT_ACTION:
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action = _SEGMENT_ACTION[seg]
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break
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if action is None:
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action = _METHOD_ACTION.get(method, method.lower())
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target_id = None
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if module_idx >= 0 and module_idx + 1 < len(parts):
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candidate = parts[module_idx + 1]
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if candidate not in _NON_ID_SEGMENTS:
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target_id = candidate
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return module, action, target_id
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class AuditMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
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"""写操作审计采集。
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必须注册在 RequestContextMiddleware **内层**,因为它依赖后者写入
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request.state 的 request_id 才能与结构化日志对账。
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"""
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def _should_audit(self, request: Request) -> bool:
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path = request.url.path
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if path.startswith(_IGNORED_PREFIXES):
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return False
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if request.method in _MUTATING_METHODS:
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return True
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if request.method == "GET":
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lowered = path.lower()
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return any(kw in lowered for kw in _SENSITIVE_READ_KEYWORDS)
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return False
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async def dispatch(
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self, request: Request, call_next: RequestResponseEndpoint
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) -> Response:
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if not self._should_audit(request):
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return await call_next(request)
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status_code = 500
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error_message: str | None = None
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try:
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response = await call_next(request)
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status_code = response.status_code
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return response
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except Exception as exc:
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# 异常最终由 ServerErrorMiddleware 转成 500;这里先标记,
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# 保证「失败的操作也有审计」——这正是选用独立 session 的目的
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error_message = f"{type(exc).__name__}: {exc}"[:1000]
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raise
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finally:
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await self._write(request, status_code, error_message)
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async def _write(
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self, request: Request, status_code: int, error_message: str | None
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) -> None:
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try:
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module, action, target_id = _derive_module_and_action(
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request.url.path, request.method
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)
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client = request.client
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await record_audit(
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action=action,
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module=module,
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user_id=getattr(request.state, "audit_user", None),
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display_name=getattr(request.state, "audit_display_name", None),
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role=getattr(request.state, "audit_role", None),
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target_type=module,
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target_id=target_id,
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# 对产品而言路径里的 ID 就是身份证号,本身即人可读的标识
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target_name=target_id if module == "product" else None,
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ip_address=client.host if client else None,
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user_agent=request.headers.get("user-agent"),
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method=request.method,
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url=request.url.path,
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status_code=status_code,
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error_message=error_message,
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request_id=getattr(request.state, "request_id", None),
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)
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except Exception:
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# record_audit 内部已兜底;这里再兜一层,确保审计绝不冒泡成 500
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logger.exception("审计采集失败(已忽略)")
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35
backend/app/core/deps.py
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backend/app/core/deps.py
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"""通用 FastAPI 依赖"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from fastapi import Depends, HTTPException, status
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from app.core.roles import ADMIN_ROLES
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from app.services.auth_service import get_current_user
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def require_roles(*roles: str):
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"""生成「限定角色」依赖,避免同一个内联判断被复制到每个端点。
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用法::
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@router.get("/x")
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async def x(current_user: dict = Depends(require_admin)):
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...
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失败一律 403 且不透露允许的角色集合(避免给探测者提供线索)。
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"""
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allowed = frozenset(roles)
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async def _guard(current_user: dict = Depends(get_current_user)) -> dict:
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if (current_user or {}).get("role") not in allowed:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
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detail="当前角色无权访问该接口",
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)
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return current_user
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return _guard
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# 审计日志等高权限接口复用同一实例
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require_admin = require_roles(*ADMIN_ROLES)
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backend/app/core/roles.py
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backend/app/core/roles.py
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"""角色定义与管理员判定 —— 单一事实来源
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背景:角色字符串此前散落在至少三处 —— task_service.ADMIN_ROLES、
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products.py 的内联判断、以及前端 constants/task.ts。同一份规则抄多份的后果
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已经发生过:前端 constants/task.ts:233 的注释记录了一次「移动端只判了
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SUPER_ADMIN、漏了 SUPERVISOR,导致主管被误挡」的事故。
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本模块把**角色常量与管理员判定**先收敛到一处,供后端统一引用。
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完整的「角色 × 权限点」可配置矩阵是后续工作;但任何推进都应从这里出发,
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不要再新增第四份副本。
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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SUPER_ADMIN = "SUPER_ADMIN"
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SUPERVISOR = "SUPERVISOR"
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# 注意:MOM 登录返回的默认角色是小写 operator(见 auth_service.login)
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OPERATOR = "OPERATOR"
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# 管理员角色:可执行收口、审计查看等高权限动作
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ADMIN_ROLES: frozenset[str] = frozenset({SUPER_ADMIN, SUPERVISOR})
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ROLE_LABELS: dict[str, str] = {
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SUPER_ADMIN: "超级管理员",
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SUPERVISOR: "主管",
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OPERATOR: "操作员",
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}
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def is_admin(role: str | None) -> bool:
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"""role 为 None / 未知值一律视为无权限(fail-closed,不做兜底放行)"""
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return role in ADMIN_ROLES
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